Report of the events of Spring 1807, by General Bennisigen, Russian C-in-C
Initial orders were given out the night
before action. A most brilliant plan was concocted to hold the
Braunsberg, Bischofsberg and Rastenburg areas. Bennisigen decided
that these three towns would control the battlefield. The plan was to
surround Ney in Bartenstein and cut him off from supply and
reinforcements. The idea was Prince Essen would move on to Bichosberg
to close the road to Bartenstein while Bagration and Gortchakov moved
on Ney before he could leave the area. Docturov and would support
Essen in his defence and Uvarov would make a move into Neys rear.
Sacken and the Prussians under L’Estoq would hold Braunsberg.
Prince Golitsyn V and Peter Tolstoy would hold the Rastenburg and
Goldap area while recognizing that a mobile defense may be needed due
to the open space. Our reserves under Lobanov would be sent where
needed. Knowing that the French outnumbered the allies in this
campaign, the hope was that a quick action on Ney would even the
battlefield.
Immediately the plan began to unravel.
Bennisigen arrived to the Heilsburg
table, from his quarters at Eylau. Ney appeared to have gotten a jump
on the Russians and arrived in the rear of the Heilsburg area.
Fortunately, the obedient Docturov followed Bennisigen to the area
and was able to respond.
The local forces of Essen had been
ordered to move to Bischofsburg but quickly found the French forces
of Soult approaching the town. With this news and Ney
arriving in force, Bennisigen could see we had to redress the lines.
Essen was ordered to form a defensive posture around Heilsburg while
Docturov formed line to meet the approaching Ney.
Although perhaps on Uvarovs own
initiative, not following Docturovs division onto Heilsburg as
ordered, he had correctly read the battlefield to move to the
Braunsberg table to support the Prussians. Bennisigen returned to the
Eylau area just in time to inform him of the changing tides of war as
well.
During these travels, new orders were
written to Gortchakov and Bagration that Ney was approaching the
Heilsburg area. They were to pursue him aggressively. Surely, they
would have seen him leaving the Bartenstein area as they approached.
Upon returning to the Eylau table,
Bennisigen decided to make his way to Bartenstein through the
Friedland area. He found his most magnificent divisions following in
Neys footsteps. Reexamining the situation, Bennisigen knew Bagrations
troops would be enough to force Ney into submission, any more would
cause a traffic jam. He now ordered Gortchakov to defend the
Bartenstein area by holding ground or attacking Bishofsburg.
Bennisigen sensed this route would be vulnerable later on…
Around this time, Bennisigen received
alarming messages from Prince Golitsyn V. His Cavalry Corp was under
great strain but had slain Massena! Leaving Bartenstein, travelling
to Angerburg, and leaving through Gumbinem, he arrived at Goldap. He
was by now getting his money’s worth out of his royal steed!
The situation was dire for Golitsyn. At
least three French corps were arriving to the table. The Remnants of
Massana units, Grouchy, and Murat. There had been sighting of
Davout’s corp but he was nowhere to be seen. Bennisigen immediately
ordered Golitsyn to leave Rastenburg and cross the river to Goldap
with what horses he could. At this time, Tolstoy entered the Field,
and not soon enough. A Polish Corp was arriving in the flank of
Goldap, and I was uncertain if Golistyn would have been able to hold
the River line. Especially with up to Five corps appearing! These
French appeared endless! Tolstoy deploying to defend the bridge and
meet the polish troops, combined with Golistyn who made a brilliant
tactical repositioning at double time over the river, Bennisigen felt
confident to make his way back to other battlefields.
However, Tolstoy reported that, he had
seen cavalry scouts and French flags deep in our rear, possibly near
Suwalken and Maryampole. Bennisigen must find Lobanov’s reserves!
He immediately dispatched orders to him as well.
News reports had been flooding into
Bennisigen by now that the troops at Braunsberg were holding strong,
however we had lost the town at Heilsburg. Fortunately, we were
grinding Ney down. His downfall was inevitable! Even as Bennisigen
read the desperate pleas from Prince Essen for help due to the weak
state of his corp, there were no reserves to spare. The die had been
cast, and the hands must be played as is.
Finding Lobanov, Bennigisen expertly
guided him through the muddy roads to Maryampole. There it became
known that the French were in fact in Suwalken. A battle soon
erupted. Orders were sent to Golitsyn that if available, they were to
approach the Polish troops from the flanks or rear. As the commander
of the whole Russian army with no troops under direct control, there
was little that could be done to add to our forces in Suwalken. Thus,
he galloped off once again.
Going to the Braunsberg area for the
first time today, Bennisigen saw that the Prussians with Russian
support had the situation under control. They were making a redeeming
effort since the debacles of 1806. Seeing once again that the troops
were sufficient, he returned to Heilsburg.
Bennigisen joined the Heilsburg forces
to rally what remained of Essen holding the road to Eylau, while
Docturov and Bagration finished off Ney. It was at this time that the
Grand Duke Constantine was arriving with the Guard. About time.
Bennisigen spent the rest of the day overseeing the bridgehead to
Eylau, inspiring all the troops there. The cowardly French did not
advance further than Heilsburg, and Ney was reduced to scraps, both
in what corp he possessed troops and himself.
Grand Duke Constantine
Grand Duke Constantine and guard
arrived to the region at Tilst at 1:30. Having gathered the
intelligence reports of the day, it was decided that they would
travel to Suwalken to ensure the Allied Flanks were secure. Marching
through Raseinia, Vilkmerge, Kovno, Kazlu Rudia, and Finally
Maryampol.
The guard arrived at the northern end
of the battlefield near Suwalken, just in time to see the French in
full retreat. Lobanov had the French on their heels and the Guard’s
arrival confirmed their decision to retreat. Not only was the Guard
enough to force the French into retreat, Golitsyn arrived on the
Flank and made short work of the stragglers. Seeing as there was no
need for the Guard to Pursue the cowardly French, Constantine gave
orders to Golitsyn and Lobanov to follow the French and exploit what
must now be a weakened French right flank. Furthermore, reports were
arriving that Davout was Marching on Bartenstein with the Bavarians.
This warranted immediate attention. Gortchakov was in no position to
fend both off and had sent urgent messages.
Constantine and the Guard made great
haste through Angerberg, years of marching paid off. They arrived to
see Gortchakov fending off the French attack with the last of his
troops. The arrival could not have been more timely. Although the
allied corp was unable to be saved from breaking, the Guard made the
pesky French stop any advance toward Konigsberg. Three guard
cavalries deployed first covered by a horse artillery to meet and
engage the French. It was greatly appreciated when they charged the
Guard first. Having been on the march all day, it saved them the walk
over. As expected, the French were brushed aside as one does to a
fly. Alarmed by this, Davout squared up the vast majority of his
infantry in the rear, as a Russian hussar eyed them. Elite French
cannon faced the Russian cavalry, but isolated from their troops for
the most part. Before the Guard could really dig their talons into
these scoundrels, darkness came and all pursuit ended.
Many thanks Peter and Mark for setting
this up and all others that supported. I had a lot of fun this
campaign and it was different playing as the commander, sure kept me
busy all day. Looking forward to the next campaign with everyone.
Sean Seibert
Here is my Campaign in a Day AAR.
From Eric the Gamer:
I flew into Connecticut to watch, learn, and play Campaign in a Day with Snappy Nappy. First, thank you to the umpires for making this happen. This took an enormous amount of effort and coordination which I hope I can pull off in the near future down here in Southport, NC. As I as the French (Bavarian) Reserve arriving after turn two, I had time to observe the campaign mechanics without the burden of command. I learned all sorts of tips and tricks from the GMs and players (especially Karl). The use of deployment zones, transit tables, etc, really brought the campaign to life. Looks like I have a lot of terrain to get ready for my smaller 6 table campaign. I’ll either be doing this with my 15mm SYW or Maximilian in Mexico collections. My friends have all the Napoleonics in 15mm so I may be able to use their figures should they all be able to come to Southport. Tally Ho!!
From Marshal Lefebvre, newly created Duke of Danzig:
My corps of 12000 men (4 x Bavarian Line Infantry, 1 x Bavarian Light Infantry, 1 Bavarian Chevau-Leger, 1 Bavarian Dragoon, 2x6 # Bavarian Foot Artillery), arrived in OSTRAU on Turn 2 + 40 minutes. OSTRAU was transit table “O”. When I flipped over the transit table map it said I had to wait 5 minutes before entering the deployment zone of Table N (Neidenburg). When I arrived at Neidenburg\Allenstein I found Davout’s III Corps waiting there. Based on his scouting of the tables around us we decided to make sure our backs were covered and sent cavalry scouts to the last two unexplored deployment zones: N3 & N4. Sadly these both led to transit tables that just called for a five minute delay. After we confirmed that our flanks were secure and I left one Bavarian garrison on Table N ,we set off for MORAG (Table M) with Davout’s III Corps leading the way. We arrived to a nearly empty table with some Russian cavalry monitoring our progress from the Deployment Zone of M3 (which lead to Table B (BARSTENSTEIN)). Lacking orders from the Emperor, Davout ordered me to hold the river line around Bischofsburg (Table M) and force back any Russian attack across the two bridges there. Davout then marched his III Corps to the sound of the guns (I wasn’t quite sure where he was heading, but he ended up at a large battle).
Davout’s III Corps sudden returned to my table complaining of traffic jams and new orders from the Emperor! We were ordered to drive on BARSTENSTEIN (Table B), to attack the Russian 6th Division holding that key crossroads. My Bavarians had been scouting that location and found the 6th Division deployed in a more “all-round” defense with BARSTENSTEIN as the central cog in that defense. My gallant Bavarians and their corn flower blue uniforms arrived on Table B from deployment zone B4. I managed to get over half my corps in the first wave of the attack with a solid line of infantry and guns. We made slow and steady progress despite my die-rolls. Davout’s Corps arrived and started to flank around Bartenstein towards B3 deployment zone. We were breaking the 6th Division when the Russian Guard cavalry arrived! Gulp! (Note: I love how unexpected things like this can happen in this Campaign) Davout’s lone cavalry and my two cavalry regiments tried to stop the Russian Guard juggernaut!
Meanwhile, I had destroyed or routed most of the 6th Division which became Exhausted (2VP). Then my troops seized Bartenstein (1 Table Control VP).
Shortly after this, most of Davout’s corps was in squares to counter the Russian Guard cavalry. At this point, I think Davout’s and my Corps could have held off the six or so Russian Guard units. However, the Gods of War ended the campaign in a day at that time.
I truly had a wonderful time. I can’t wait to play in another one and hopefully run one here.
Marshal Lefebvre!
Aka Eric
Memoir
of the Action at Heilsberg
From
the campaign journal of Auguste Petiet, aide-de-camp to Marshal
Soult, June 1807
(Fictional
reconstruction based on the supplied account of the engagement. The
narrative is written in Petiet’s imagined first-person voice, with
the events and outcome drawn from the material provided).
I.
The Marshal’s Decision
The
Marshal’s decision to march upon Heilsberg was not taken without
deliberation. In the days preceding the action, when our headquarters
remained at Morag, he had communicated with Marshal Ney, whose corps
lay at Bartenstein, proposing that we should converge upon Heilsberg
and compel the enemy to accept battle there. Our respective
movements, if properly timed, promised to place the Russians in an
awkward position about the bends of the Alle. Ney, advancing from the
east, would threaten their communications and hold their attention,
whilst we, approaching from the west by Bischofsberg, would bring the
weight of our corps against their opposite flank.
Ney
accepted the proposal readily. He was ever impatient of delay when an
enemy lay within reach, and the prospect of a general engagement
appeared to please him greatly.
The
Marshal, however, was not satisfied with the arrangement for long. He
summoned me to examine the roads and positions upon our maps, and for
some time considered the consequences of the movement with a
seriousness that I had learned to recognize as the prelude to a
change of plan.
He
observed that Ney’s advance might indeed fix the Russians within
the bend of the river, but it might equally expose him to the
consequences of his own boldness. If enemy columns followed him from
the east, they could interpose themselves between his corps and the
country upon which he depended for reinforcements and provisions. The
very movement intended to entrap the Russians might thus leave Ney
entrapped himself.
“Marshal
Ney,” he remarked, “will not easily be persuaded to abandon an
enemy merely because the ground is inconvenient.”
The
remark was made without irritation. It expressed rather an
understanding of Ney’s character, and of the danger that a
commander’s eagerness might sometimes outrun the calculations of
his superior.
Ney’s
answer soon confirmed the Marshal’s apprehensions. If the Russians
were at Heilsberg, he declared, then Heilsberg was where he intended
to attack them.
Soult
thereupon determined to march eastward upon Bischofsburg and thence
northward towards Heilsberg, whilst Ney continued his advance from
Bartenstein. The two corps would still meet, but our movements would
be less dependent upon the assumption that Ney could be safely
maintained in the enemy’s rear.
I
accompanied the Marshal throughout these preparations. His concern
was not that Ney lacked courage, but that courage, exercised without
sufficient regard for the disposition of neighboring forces, might
oblige another commander to undertake a difficult action merely to
redeem an earlier promise.
Yet
the promise had been given. The Marshal would keep it.
II.
The Enemy upon the Road
Our
march towards Bischofsburg proceeded with the customary difficulties
of a campaign conducted upon roads rendered heavy by the weather and
incessant military traffic. The columns extended over considerable
distances, the infantry moving in succession whilst the artillery and
its teams demanded continual attention. Behind the foremost troops
followed the several brigades of the corps, whose arrival would
determine whether the Marshal could undertake a serious engagement
without exposing himself to defeat in detail.
Our
advance guard was commanded by General of Brigade Guyot. It consisted
of the 16th Chasseurs, followed by a brigade of elite light infantry.
Five brigades of line infantry followed, accompanied by batteries of
medium and heavy artillery.
It
was a powerful force, though its strength could not be brought to
bear everywhere at once. The roads and approaches to Heilsberg would
permit only a portion of it to deploy conveniently, and the river,
with its bridges and constricted crossings, promised to make the
first encounter particularly hazardous.
It
was during this advance that we encountered Russian cavalry upon the
road between Bischofsburg and Heilsberg.
They
appeared suddenly, as if sent forward to ascertain the strength and
direction of our march. Their stay was brief. Having recognized the
character of the force approaching them, they turned about and
retired at speed, evidently to carry the news to their commanders.
The
Marshal watched their departure.
“They
will know we are coming,” he said. “We must therefore suppose
that they shall be prepared to receive us.”
There
was no occasion to imagine that surprise would favor us. The Russians
had been warned, and we were approaching ground upon which they could
establish themselves before our arrival.
Nevertheless,
the Marshal continued northward.
The
information available to us did not reveal the whole extent of the
Russian dispositions. We knew that the enemy possessed forces in the
vicinity of Heilsberg, but not that General Bennigsen had originally
conceived a broader design involving the simultaneous occupation of
Braunsberg, Bischofsberg, and Rastenburg. His intention, as I
subsequently understood from the reports and circumstances of the
campaign, had been to isolate Ney at Bartenstein, close the roads by
which he might receive assistance, and overwhelm him before our other
forces could intervene.
Prince
Essen was to move upon Bischofsberg and obstruct the communications
to Bartenstein; Prince Bagration and General Gortchakov were to
advance against Ney; General Dokhturov was to support Essen; and
General Uvarov was to threaten Ney’s rear. Other forces were
charged with securing the remaining important positions, whilst the
Russian reserves were to be committed wherever necessity demanded.
It
was a plan founded upon the belief that a rapid concentration against
one isolated French corps might compensate for the numerical
difficulties confronting the Allies elsewhere.
But
the plan had begun to unravel before its intended blows could be
delivered. Ney was moving sooner than the Russians had anticipated,
and the appearance of our corps from the south and west compelled
their commanders to revise their arrangements.
Thus
the enemy who had hoped to determine the place of battle found
himself obliged to defend it.
III.
The Bridge over the Alle
We
reached Heilsberg to find the Russians established beyond the bridge
over the Alle.
The
ground offered little room for an extensive deployment. The river
constrained movement, and the enemy had occupied positions behind
entrenchments on the far side of the crossing. Prince Essen commanded
the forces immediately opposing us, with General Bennigsen and other
Russian officers directing the defense.
The
Marshal dismounted to examine the approaches. I remained beside him
as he studied the enemy’s works and the ground about the bridge.
The
situation was plain enough. A deliberate deployment under the Russian
fire would expose our leading troops to losses before they could make
any effective return. Our artillery might eventually assist in
reducing the position, but the narrow approaches and the enemy’s
prepared defenses would make the operation slow. To retire and seek
another passage would consume time, imperil our promised junction
with Ney, and risk allowing the Russians to concentrate against
either corps separately.
There
are moments in war when the choice lies not between a prudent action
and a rash one, but between two dangers, each of which must be
measured against the consequences of delay.
The
Marshal concluded that we must attack.
He
did not mistake audacity for an absence of danger. Rather, he
understood that the enemy’s position, formidable as it appeared,
could not be allowed to dictate the whole course of our operations.
General
Guyot received his instructions. The 16th Chasseurs were to lead the
assault across the bridge, supported by the elite light infantry
following the advance guard. The infantry and artillery behind them
would exploit any opening the cavalry could create.
It
was a bold employment of light cavalry against a prepared position,
and the Marshal knew that the regiment would be required to
accomplish what ordinarily might have been entrusted to infantry.
The
Chasseurs advanced.
The
first moments of the attack were confused by the confined ground, the
Russian fire, and the difficulty of bringing the leading squadrons
into action without disorder. The enemy’s infantry held its
position, and the guns defending the approach added to the peril of
the crossing.
Yet
the 16th pressed forward with a determination that astonished even
those of us who had witnessed its earlier service.
They
reached the bridge, passed over it under fire, and fell upon the
Russian troops before the defenders could recover from the shock of
their advance. The first line gave way. The cavalry continued its
charge, carrying the confusion into the next body of troops, whilst
the Russian guns were overrun or rendered incapable of maintaining
their original defence.
I
saw the Marshal follow the movement with the closest attention. He
had committed the regiment to an undertaking whose success would
determine whether our corps could enter the town, and he understood
that hesitation at this moment might undo the advantage already
gained.
The
Chasseurs did not hesitate.
Their
charge broke the Russian position at the bridge and opened the way
for the troops behind them. The first line of Essen’s defense had
been overthrown with a rapidity that neither the strength of the
entrenchments nor the natural obstacles appeared to justify.
I
have rarely witnessed a more consequential action by a single
regiment.
The
Marshal’s expression changed little, but he immediately directed
that the advantage be exploited. The elite light infantry was brought
forward, and the succeeding brigades began to press towards the town.
Heilsberg,
however, was not yet ours in any secure sense. The bridge had been
carried, but the Russians retained troops within and beyond the town,
and their commanders had not abandoned the contest.
The
first obstacle had been overcome. The battle itself had only begun.
IV.
The Town and the Russian Counterstroke
The
capture of the bridgehead placed the Russians in a predicament, but
it did not destroy their capacity for resistance.
Prince
Essen had initially intended to interfere with our movement south of
Heilsberg and prevent our junction with Ney. Discovering our advance
earlier than expected, he had returned to the town and assumed a
defensive posture. The river protected one flank of his position,
whilst the village and its approaches provided opportunities to
maintain a defence in depth.
It
was a sensible arrangement under the circumstances. Though his
initial line had been broken, the position still offered considerable
advantages to a commander prepared to sacrifice ground gradually
rather than stake everything upon the defense of a single
entrenchment.
Essen’s
cavalry was committed against the 16th Chasseurs in an effort to
recover the ground lost at the bridge. The Russian horsemen attacked
with determination, and Prince Essen himself advanced in the hope of
restoring the situation.
The
attempt failed.
The
Chasseurs, already distinguished by their conduct in the assault,
proved their superiority once again. They repulsed the Russian
cavalry and sent the Prince’s troops reeling from the contest.
Essen sustained a grazing wound, though he remained with his command.
The
regiment had by now accomplished far more than its original duty as
an advance guard. It had carried the crossing, overthrown several
bodies of infantry, and repelled an enemy cavalry counterattack. Its
conduct gave the Marshal the freedom to bring forward the remainder
of his corps.
But
the fighting at Heilsberg was not a contest between our troops and
Essen alone.
Ney’s
corps had arrived from the east, and General Dokhturov’s Russians
were moving to oppose him. Prince Bagration, advancing in the same
general area, added further weight to the enemy’s effort to destroy
the French corps before it could combine effectively with ours.
The
Russians were therefore able to strike at Ney while Essen continued
to dispute the possession of Heilsberg with us.
This
was precisely the danger that had concerned the Marshal before the
march. Ney had entered the enemy’s sphere of action, and the
Russians were now attempting to separate him from the rest of the
French army by means of the river and their positions about the
roads.
Yet
Ney’s arrival also offered an advantage. He could not permit
Essen’s force to hold the town unmolested whilst our troops were
engaged in forcing their way through the bridgehead. Accordingly, his
infantry was committed against the Russian elite troops defending the
eastern approaches.
The
attack succeeded in driving Essen’s elite infantry northward from
its position, though the French advance was not without interruption.
For a time the fighting settled into an uncertain contest, each side
attempting to recover its formation and bring fresh troops into
action.
I
had occasion during this period to observe the Marshal repeatedly
turn his attention from the immediate struggle in front of him to the
distant sounds and movements that indicated the course of Ney’s
engagement. He knew that the issue could not be determined by the
capture of a town alone. If Ney were destroyed, the Russians would be
free to turn against our corps; if Ney survived, our combined forces
might yet compel them to withdraw.
The
problem was one of time.
We
had gained the bridge, but the Russians still possessed sufficient
strength to resist us. Ney had reached the field, but his corps was
becoming engaged against forces whose numbers and positions
threatened to overwhelm him.
The
Marshal continued to push the attack.
V.
Ney’s Peril
The
reports reaching us from the eastern approaches grew increasingly
serious.
Dokhturov
was pressing Ney, whilst Bagration’s troops were arriving behind
the French positions. The Russians had recognized that Ney’s
eagerness to attack had placed him in a dangerous position, and they
were determined to exploit it before our corps could relieve the
pressure.
Prince
Essen, whose own force was suffering heavily, requested assistance
from the Russian commanders. Bennigsen, meanwhile, was occupied by
the broader situation of the army. French forces threatened other
parts of the theatre, and the Russian commander had reports of danger
to the north and east, including the movements of additional French
corps against his communications and positions.
He
could not bring every available formation to Heilsberg without
risking the loss of other important points.
The
Russians were thus compelled to continue the battle with the troops
already engaged, even as the condition of Essen’s command
deteriorated.
There
followed a brief interval in which Ney’s fortunes appeared to
improve. Bagration’s pressure had not yet produced the decisive
result the Russians desired, and the French marshal retained
sufficient strength to resist.
But
the respite did not last.
The
French cavalry arrived in support of the action, bringing fresh
strength to our side of the engagement. The appearance of these
troops was accompanied by rumors of a French general killed by a
cannonball. I could not ascertain the truth of the report at the
time, nor whether it referred to Marshal Murat, whose movements had
been the subject of much discussion. The uncertainty itself was
characteristic of such a day, when alarming news travelled more
quickly than confirmation.
The
cavalry’s arrival nevertheless changed the immediate situation
around Heilsberg. Our infantry, which had been engaged for some time,
could now continue its advance with the prospect of support from
fresh troops.
The
elite light infantry renewed its attack. Further Russian infantry was
overrun, and the town passed into our possession.
This
was an important success, but it was not the end of the action.
Essen’s remaining troops were exhausted, and the Russian cavalry
had already suffered from repeated attempts to dislodge the
Chasseurs. Yet the Russian position north of the town remained
dangerous, and the enemy was still capable of striking at Ney.
The
fighting on the eastern side of Heilsberg became increasingly
desperate.
Ney’s
corps, which had entered the engagement with the expectation of
bringing the Russians to battle, was now fighting for its existence.
Bagration and Dokhturov continued their attacks, and the French
marshal’s ability to maintain an organized defense diminished with
each successive encounter.
The
Marshal Soult received reports of Ney’s predicament, and I could
see that the situation had become the chief concern of his
deliberations. He had fulfilled his promise to reach Heilsberg; he
had forced the bridge and taken the town. Yet the destruction of Ney
would render these achievements insufficient, for it would leave the
French position exposed to the enemy’s remaining forces.
The
struggle had assumed a terrible irony. The Russians had originally
intended to isolate Ney, and Ney had advanced into the very region
where their plan was meant to take effect. Our arrival had frustrated
the intended concentration, but it had not prevented the enemy from
placing him in extreme danger.
The
fate of the battle now depended upon whether the remaining French
troops could endure long enough for our successes at Heilsberg to
have their full effect.
VI.
The Last Resistance at Heilsberg
The
Russian defense did not collapse all at once.
Although
the town was in our hands, Essen’s remaining infantry continued to
resist, and his cavalry made further efforts to recover the ground
lost earlier in the day. The 16th Chasseurs repulsed these attacks
again, their conduct becoming one of the most remarkable features of
the engagement.
The
regiment had repeatedly advanced into danger, and its losses and
exertions must have been considerable. Yet it continued to act with a
confidence that made it difficult for the Russian cavalry to recover
the initiative.
Essen
himself attempted to rescue what remained of his elite infantry. He
advanced to extract them from their exposed position, but the
movement came too late. Our infantry attacked from the south, whilst
the Russians were threatened from the east and north by the pressure
of the battle as a whole.
The
Prince sustained another grazing wound, though he escaped capture.
His remaining infantry, having been subjected to repeated attacks and
deprived of the possibility of a secure withdrawal, was left in a
desperate condition. I cannot state with certainty how many
surrendered, but the circumstances strongly suggest that many could
no longer continue an organized defense.
By
this stage, Essen’s corps had ceased to function as an effective
instrument for holding Heilsberg.
The
Marshal did not mistake the capture of the town for the destruction
of the Russian army. He understood that the enemy still possessed
troops capable of continuing the struggle, and that the arrival of
additional Russian formations could alter the situation even after
the loss of the bridgehead.
Bennigsen
returned to the Heilsberg area and personally rallied the surviving
troops. The Grand Duke Constantine was also arriving with the Russian
Guard, an indication that the enemy was still capable of assembling
considerable forces despite the losses sustained earlier in the day.
The
Russians continued to contest the approaches north of Heilsberg,
while their forces attempted to complete the destruction of Ney’s
corps.
For
our part, the Marshal strengthened his position. The elite light
infantry, led by the 10th Regiment, had secured the town, and three
additional brigades reinforced the occupation. Two further brigades
were deployed west of the Alle in an attempt to turn the Russian
position and approach the town from the opposite side.
This
maneuver succeeded in extending our pressure beyond the original
bridgehead. The Russians could no longer rely upon the river and
their prepared positions to prevent the French from gaining ground
around Heilsberg.
Nevertheless,
the Marshal did not advance indiscriminately into the enemy’s
remaining positions. The troops had been engaged for many hours, the
roads and approaches were crowded, and the opposing armies were
intermingled across a broad area. A further advance in failing light,
against troops still capable of resistance, could have turned a
successful operation into an unnecessarily hazardous pursuit.
The
contest continued until nightfall.
By
then the town was securely in our possession. Essen’s force had
been gravely reduced, and Ney’s corps had suffered a catastrophe
from which only a small remnant could be gathered. Bagration, whose
troops had been instrumental in the destruction of Ney’s command,
was himself compelled to withdraw northward.
The
Russians had achieved much of what they originally intended against
Ney, but they had failed to retain Heilsberg or to prevent our corps
from reaching the field.
The
final result was therefore more complicated than either side might
have wished to admit.
VII.
Reflections upon the Engagement
The
action at Heilsberg offered a striking demonstration of the manner in
which a battle may be decided by the interaction of separate
movements rather than by a single general plan.
The
Russian design had been ambitious. Bennigsen intended to use the
principal towns and roads to divide the French forces, isolate Ney,
and destroy him before assistance could arrive. The plan recognised
the danger of confronting the French army in a general engagement
without first reducing its numerical and operational advantages.
Yet
its success depended upon timing.
Ney’s
early movement disrupted the intended arrangement, whilst Soult’s
approach from the south and west compelled the Russians to revise
their positions. Prince Essen, whose mission had been to obstruct the
French advance, found himself defending Heilsberg against a force
already upon him. Dokhturov and Bagration were drawn into the
struggle against Ney, and Bennigsen was obliged to divide his
attention among several threatened sectors.
The
Russians were not without success. Ney’s corps was nearly
destroyed, and the pressure exerted by Bagration and Dokhturov
demonstrated the danger of a commander advancing without adequate
security for his communications. Had Ney been entirely annihilated
before our arrival could influence the course of the engagement, the
capture of Heilsberg would have been a poor compensation for the loss
of so considerable a corps.
But
Soult’s decision to proceed, despite his apprehensions concerning
Ney’s position, prevented the Russians from concentrating all their
strength upon the town and its approaches. His arrival forced the
enemy to fight upon more than one front and denied them the unimpeded
opportunity to exploit their initial advantage.
The
crossing of the Alle was the decisive episode in our own engagement.
The position was strong, the approach constricted, and the enemy
prepared. Yet the 16th Chasseurs, by their extraordinary charge,
broke the first line and allowed the remainder of the corps to enter
the battle. Without their success, the Marshal might have been
compelled to choose between a costly assault upon the entrenchments
and a withdrawal that would have jeopardized his junction with Ney.
The
regiment deserves particular mention. Its performance was not merely
spirited; it was decisive. It carried the bridge, overthrew
successive bodies of infantry, defeated the Russian cavalry sent
against it, and continued to contribute to the capture of the town
despite the fatigue of repeated engagements. I have seldom seen light
cavalry perform a more consequential service against a prepared
enemy.
The
elite infantry also distinguished itself. Its attacks helped convert
the initial success at the bridge into possession of the town, and
the subsequent reinforcement of Heilsberg ensured that our gains
could be maintained through the evening.
As
for the Marshal, I was struck throughout the day by the consistency
of his judgment. He recognized the dangers of Ney’s proposed
movement before the battle, altered his own approach without
abandoning the intended junction, and attacked the Russian bridgehead
when the circumstances left no satisfactory alternative. Once the
crossing had been forced, he continued to exploit the advantage while
keeping the larger situation in view.
He
was not a commander who required the appearance of perfect
circumstances before acting. He calculated the dangers, selected the
course that offered the best prospect of success, and accepted the
risks that remained.
The
outcome also exposed the limitations of a plan whose several parts
depended upon simultaneous execution. Bennigsen’s original
conception had merit, but the unexpected appearance of French troops
and the early movement of Ney forced him to respond to events rather
than dictate them. His subsequent efforts to direct troops across a
wide theatre of operations could not entirely remedy the disruption
caused at Heilsberg.
It
would be unjust, however, to describe the Russian commander as having
failed in every respect. Ney’s destruction demonstrated that the
Russian attacks had been conducted with determination and that the
original design had retained considerable force even after its
intended sequence had been disturbed.
The
Russians lost Heilsberg, but they exacted a heavy price for it.
For
the French, the possession of the town was a tangible success, though
one purchased amid severe losses and the destruction of a neighboring
corps. The action did not resolve every difficulty in the campaign,
nor did the retreat of Bagration signify the complete defeat of the
Russian army. It did, however, preserve our position at Heilsberg and
prevent the enemy from converting Ney’s peril into an unqualified
victory.
When
darkness finally put an end to the fighting, I remained with the
Marshal as reports continued to arrive from the different parts of
the field. The noise of the guns had ceased, but the work of the army
was far from over. Wounded men had to be collected, units
reassembled, ammunition accounted for, and orders prepared for the
following day.
The
Marshal listened to the reports without visible agitation. His
attention remained fixed upon the condition of the corps and the
positions that must be held before the campaign could proceed.
I
had seen him thoughtful before the battle, determined at the bridge,
and attentive throughout the long contest for the town. I now saw him
return to the business of command with the same composure with which
he had undertaken it that morning.
Heilsberg
had been won, but it had not been an easy victory.
The
Russians had come near to destroying Ney. We had broken their
bridgehead, taken the town, and forced Bagration to retire. Between
these opposing results lay the true character of the engagement: a
contest in which both armies had inflicted grave injury upon the
other, and in which the possession of a single town could not conceal
the cost of the day.
For
my own part, I shall remember above all the charge of the 16th
Chasseurs across the bridge. In that brief and perilous passage, the
regiment accomplished what the whole situation demanded of it. It
broke the obstacle before us, gave the Marshal the opportunity to
fulfil his promise to Ney, and changed the course of the fighting at
Heilsberg.
The
regiment had earned its place in the history of the day.
The report of General Sacken:
I started at Tagiau, with orders to proceed to Braunsberg. There were two routes I could take: via Konigsberg, or via Eylau. The Konigsberg route had the better roads, so that is the route I took.
When I arrived at Konigsberg, Gen. L'Estoq was on the road to Braunsberg. He said that I could pass through his troops, but to me this seemed an invitation to confusion of troops. I judged that the fastest way to Braunsberg now was to go from Konigsberg to Eylau, and thence to Braunsberg. The roads were not as good, but the lack of traffic would more than compensate.
I arrived at Braunsberg, to see that the French under Bernadotte already had control of the town. Bernadotte's corps was the only French on the map, and he was already facing Uvarov and L'Estoq. He didn't seem happy to see me, and I thought that he might retreat in the face of such odds, but he did not. Obviously, his orders were to hold at all costs. He was also expecting reinforcements, or so I judged. My supposition proved correct when a few turns later more French corps arrived.
Space was limited, but I saw that I could bring up my artillery to help drive out the French. This I did as quickly as I could, but it took several turns. I began my bombardment; L'Estoq had already begun his. Bernadotte had brought artillery into Braunsberg, and they were a tough nut to crack.
After about an hour, I received a message from Essen, my immediate supervisor. He was desparate for help in Heilsberg, and ordering me to go to his aid. By this time, there were four French corps fighting to drive us away. I was not happy about this order; it had taken about four turns to bring my guns to bear, and it would take four turns to exit the map, leaving my compatriots, L'Estoq and Uvarov to face the four French corps. In addition, my roulte to Heilsberg was not direct. I would have to go to Eylau, and then to Heilsberg.
Fortunately, at this time our overall commander, Benningsen, arrived. I talked about the order to him. He told me that Braunsberg was more important than Heilsberg, so I was to stay there and fight. This was a relief.
After many barrages, the French artillery was driven from Braunsberg. L'Estoq was able to commence an assault on the town, even though he was hard pressed by two French corps. L'Estoq was on our right, and Uvarov on our left. He was attacked by the French Imperial Cavalry. They were formdable troops, My own infantry had not yet been involved in combat, but I didn't want to commit them until certain of how the left and right wing were doing. My troops had becomes a reserve, and committing them too soon could be disastrous.
L'Estoq was able to stabilize his flank, and drove the French out of Braunsberg. Uvarov was had pressed, so I brought two of my line brigades into position to support him, with a 6 pounder artillery between them. I put those line infantry into solid square, because if the French broke through on the left, it would be with cavalry.
I brought my grenadiers and jaegers up towards Braunsberg, but the fighting ended before they could get into action. While L'Estoq was fighting for Braunsberg, I could not bombard the French in the town, so my 12 pounder attacked French infantry near the town. They had formed square in anticipation of fighting Uvarov's cavalry, but this was fine with me. I believe they were Bernadotte's troops. The barrage drove them back in rout. They passed through an infantry brigade already badly shaken, and that brigade panicked and fled the field. At least I did some good.
Your obedient servant,
Gen. Sacken
Napoleon's Bulletin from the Grand Armee, concerning the fighting in Poland during the Spring of 1807, as published in Le Moniteur in Paris, July 1807.
Unfortunately, the Emperor's correspondence was made extremely difficult by the bands of roving Cossacks intercepting messages (James had email account problems!), making effective planning for the Spring Campaign most challenging. Still, his Imperial Majesty's Marshals developed a preliminary concept for the Campaign.
The campaign commenced with some degree of surprise at the rate of the Tsar's ensuing offensive. It developed that some three or so chokepoints were present in network of poor roads traversing Poland. Thus the bulk of the fighting occurred at those locations, running ROUGHLY north-to-south, namely Braunsberg, Heilsberg, and Rastenburg. The Emperor insisted on a sequential advance, so the troops already in the region of our supply base were holding it until new troops came in, at which point the forces there were released to move on to the next step. His Imperial Majesty was very concerned about the possibility of our foes working their way around and undoing our supply base or region [loss of this would have counted as 4 VP to the Russians, as well as putting all of our troops out of supply]. When the Imperial Guard made its appearance later in June, all remaining troops were released to the front, but Marshal Bessieres was directed to firmly hold the region of our supply depot (Marienburg and Elbing), meaning that if and when any enemy incursion came in, they would attack that force immediately, but otherwise they were to remain in the area to fend off any such incursions.
This meant that the bulk of the fighting was carried out by the various Corps. The Emperor's agents maintained to him that the enemy were more pressed than the Emperor had been.
At the outset of the campaign the potooniers were attached to the later arriving Poles. The Emperor reasoned that they would be best situated to work their way around the enemy's Southern flank more feasibly and thus try to threaten the Russian supply base at Koenigsberg from the south or even the East. Meanwhile the rest of the French troops would tangle up the bulk of the Russians in a series of closely contested battles. In the event, things did not develop as anticipated by his Imperial majesty by any account. The Russians were a LOT more aggressive than the Emperor expected them to be. Still, our brave men, lead by such indomitable leaders as Marshals Bernadotte, Lannes, Massena, Soult, Davout, Murat, Mortier, Lefebvre, P:rice Poniatowski and General Grouchy, covered themselves with glory and were able to stymie any further advance and fight them to a draw. The Emperor anticipates, that having exhausted two of the enemy Corps, that he will yet force the Tsar and the King to sue for peace by the end of the summer.
Vive l' Empereur!
The unit had a umber of uniform idiosyncrasies at various stages of its existence, so I have of course chosen to represent them. The regiment's band (as opposed to the individual company units drummers) had sky blue uniforms faced yellow, and in the Royal Guard and for some time thereafter, the sappers wore reversed colors; both are depicted here. 
